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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

NINTH CIRCUIT
Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 F.3d 398
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's
failure to require review of Notices of Intent, the equivalent of a
permit, and failure to allow public availability and public comment of
the Notices of Intent violates the express requirements of the Clean
Water Act).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard
three consolidated cases challenging a final rule ("Phase II Rule")
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The
EPA issued a rule pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to control
pollutants entering the nation's waters by storm sewers. The rule
mandated that discharges from construction sites between one and
five acres and from small municipal separate storm sewer systems
("MS4s") be subject to the general permitting requirements of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). The
Texas Cities Coalition on Stormwater and the Texas Counties
Stormwater Coalition ("Municipal Parties") challenged the rule in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the following
grounds: (1) the EPA promulgated the rule in a procedurally defective
manner; (2) the rule violated the Tenth Amendment because it
impermissibly requires municipalities to regulate their own citizens;
and (3) the rule violated the First Amendment because it requires
municipalities to communicate a federally mandated message. The
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") intervened against the
The Environmental Defense Center ("EDC"),
Municipal Parties.
("Environmental Parties") challenged the rule in
NRDC,
the
by
joined
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit claiming that
the regulations: (1) constitute a program of impermissible selfregulation; (2) fail to provide adequate public participation; and (3)
do not address stormwater runoff from other significant sources of
The National Association of Home Builders and the
pollution.
American Forest and Paper Association ("Industry Parties") challenged
the rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
asserting: (1) the EPA promulgated the rule defectively in violation of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act; (2) the EPA acted ultra vires by
regulating future sources of runoff pollution; and (3) the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by choosing to regulate construction sites
between one and five acres. The court upheld the rule as to all the
challenges except the first two asserted by the Environmental Parties.
Stormwater runoff is a significant contributor to water pollution in
The sources of stormwater runoff include
the United States.
discharges from construction sites, industrial facilities, urban
development, and many more. In 1985, three-quarters of the states
cited urban runoff as a major cause of water body impairment. Also,
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stormwater runoff is associated with the impairment of surveyed ocean
waters.
Congress attempted to minimize the pollution from
stormwater by requiring the EPA to enact a Phase I Rule and a Phase II
Rule. The Municipal, Environmental and Industry Parties challenged
the Phase II Rule in this case.
MunicipalParties
The Municipal Parties first claimed that the statutory authority
under section 402(p) (6) of the CWA requiring the EPA to develop a
comprehensive program to regulate stormwater runoff excluded the
option of enacting a program based on NPDES permits. They argued
that Congress failed to include permitting in the statutory list of
actions. In refuting this claim, the appellate court reiterated that the
list is not manifestly exclusive. For this reason, Congress intended to
give the EPA more than the listed activities in the statute. The
Municipal Parties also argued that the structure of section 402(p),
which contains a separate statutory section requiring permits for
medium and large MS4s, indicates that Congress would have inserted a
separate statutory section for permitting of small MS4s. The court
looked to a statutory section enacting a permitting moratorium that
applied only to Phase II dischargers. The court determined that the
existence of a moratorium necessarily implied that the EPA retained
authority to require permits after the expiration of the moratorium.
The Municipal Parties' argument therefore violated the principle that
interpretation of a statute should not render other provisions
superfluous. The court determined that the EPA acted within its
statutorily granted authority.
The Municipal Parties raised a facial Tenth Amendment challenge
to the Phase II Rule. In particular, the Municipal Parties claimed the
Phase II Rule excessively interfered with local government functions
and compelled small MS4s to regulate upstream dischargers. The
court started with the premise that for a facial challenge, the
Municipal Parties must demonstrate there are no circumstances in
which the challenged provision is constitutional. The court concluded
that the individual and general permitting requirements of the Phase
II Rule, even though they require operators of small MS4s to regulate
third parties, do not unconstitutionally coerce because the small MS4
discharges have two alternative options to the permits: not discharging
and the alternative permit option. The Municipal Parties argued that
not discharging stormwater into federal waters provided an unfeasible
option. The court stated that the fact that the alternative proved to be
more difficult or more expensive did not alter the legal framework
under which a municipality may chose to discard their stormwater.
Further, the alternative permit option allowed the operator of a small
MS4 to seek individualized permission to discharge based on the Phase
II Rule permitting rubric for large and medium MS4s. This option
allowed small MS4s to avoid regulation of third parties. The court
ruled that the Municipal Parties failed to meet the standard of

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

demonstrating no circumstances where the alleged rule was
constitutional.
Finally, the Municipal Parties argued that the Phase II Rule
violated the First Amendment. The key challenge resulted from a part
of the rule entitled the "Public Education and Outreach" Minimum
Measures, which ordered small MS4s to distribute materials to the
community about the impact of stormwater runoff on water sources.
The Municipal Parties argued that neither Congress nor the EPA may
dictate the speech of small MS4s. The court rejected the argument
because the broad requirements did not dictate that the small MS4s
convey either a specific message or an affirmation of a specific belief.
Conveying information to the public about safe toxin disposal
contained no ideological component. For these reasons, the court
held that the public information component was constitutional.
EnvironmentalParties
The Environmental Parties challenged the Phase II Rule claiming
it contravened the CWA by allowing small MS4s to create stormwater
The
pollution controls without adequate regulatory oversight.
Environmental Parties specifically challenged the general permitting
scheme. The court determined that general permitting schemes
provide the EPA with lawful means of regulating discharges. Under a
general permitting scheme, each general permit outlined the
technology required and the effluent limitations to adequately protect
a water source from a class of dischargers. The dischargers may then
acquire permission to discharge by filing a Notice of Intent ("NOI").
The NOI simply represents an acceptance of the parameters of the
general permitting scheme and the EPA need not review each
particular NOI.
The general permitting scheme for the Phase II Rule differed from
traditional general permitting schemes mentioned above. The CWA
requires that the EPA ensure that operators of small MS4s comply with
general effluent limitations, but at the same time, EPA must ensure
that operators of small MS4s "reduce the discharge of pollutants to the
maximum extent practicable." Using the first part of the Chevron test,
where Congress clearly expressed its intent, the court required that the
EPA must review each individual NOI. The court decided that a
general permitting scheme would ensure that every discharger meet
the effluent limitations, but the scheme in no way could ensure that
every small MS4 reduced "the discharge of pollutants to the maximum
extent practicable." The court required meaningful review by the
appropriate regulatory agency before approval of an NOI.
The Environmental Parties also claimed that the general
permitting scheme failed to provide adequate public participation
because the EPA did not provide the public with notice or opportunity
for NOI hearings. The court used the first part of the Chevron test and
looked at provisions in the CWA requiring that permit applications be
available for public review and a hearing. The court then stated that
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the NOI equivocated to a permit application, so the EPA must involve
public participation in the general permitting scheme.
Finally, the Environmental Parties argued that the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when designating regulated sources under
the Phase II Rule. The Environmental Parties asserted that many
other serious sources of stormwater pollution designated in a list called
Group A Facilities were subject to regulation under the Phase II Rule.
The Group A Facilities consisted of stormwater dischargers similar to
regulated dischargers under the Phase I Rule, but intentionally
excluded from regulation. The EPA conducted studies of many
sources of stormwater pollution, but the EPA only enacted the Phase II
Rule to apply to small MS4s and construction sites. The court deferred
to the EPA's interpretation of the statute because the statute did not
require the EPA to consider Group A sources individually. The
Environmental Parties also claimed that the EPA acted arbitrarily by
not including forest roads under the Phase II Rule. The court
deferred to the EPA's interpretation because the statutory language
only mentioned that the Phase II Rule specifically applied to
municipal and industrial sources and not agriculture.
Industry Parties

The Industry Parties contended that the EPA violated the
Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") by not conducting the requisite
analysis. The RFA requires federal agencies to prepare and analyze
the economic impacts proposed rules may have on small business
entities. Under the RFA, an agency need not conduct the analysis if
the proposed rule will not have significant economic impacts on a
substantial number of small entities. The court concluded that the
EPA correctly determined that the Phase II Rule did not trigger an
RFA analysis. The court determined that even if the EPA erroneously
concluded that there was no impact, the Small Business Advocacy
Panel conducted by the EPA sufficed for the economic analysis under
the RFA.
The Industry Parties also argued that the EPA improperly acted by
authorizing the designation of future sources of stormwater pollution.
The Phase II Rule allowed the EPA and authorized state agencies to
require currently unregulated stormwater dischargers to apply for a
permit under the rule when future circumstances warrant regulation.
The Industry Parties argued that allowing future designation falls
outside of the EPA's permitted authority. The court rejected the
Industry Parties' argument on the basis that section 402(p)(6)
authorizes a comprehensive approach, which allows regional
determination of polluting dischargers even if that type of source does
not compromise water quality on a national scale. The court looked to
the plain language of the statute, which provided no specific date for
designation of stormwater sources and rejected the Industry Parties'
argument.
Finally, the Industry Parties contended that the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when designating small MS4s and small
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construction sites within the purview of the Phase II Rule. They
argued that the EPA's use of Census-Bureau data to designate small
MS4s lacked a sound basis. The Industry Parties asserted that the EPA
failed to establish a correlation between population size and
stormwater pollution. The court treated the EPA's designation with
great deference. The court denied the Industry Parties' assertion that
the EPA must establish the correlation with pinpoint precision. For
areas of technical expertise, courts do not require perfect data or
studies. The Industry Parties also argued that the EPA's designation of
small construction sites between one and five acres as falling under the
Phase II Rule lacked sufficient support in the record. Again, the court
gave great deference to the EPA on this claim. Under an arbitrary and
capricious standard, the court would have reversed only if the EPA
relied on factors Congress did not intend for them to consider. The
court looked to the record, which contained more than twenty studies
of stormwater pollution impacts from small construction sites, and
found EPA's designation of small construction sites under the Phase II
Rule plausible. Thus, the EPA acted according to the record when
designating small construction sites under the Phase II Rule.
Adriano Martinez

California Trout, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Conmn'n, 313 F.3d
1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding state water quality certification required
by the Clean Water Act does not limit federal authority to permit
ongoing projects pending relicensing).
California Trout, Inc. ("Trout") petitioned for review of a Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") order that denied its request
for rehearing and revocation of the annual license for Project 1933,
operated by Southern California Edison ("Edison"). At issue was
whether FERC acted within its authority when it issued annual licenses
to Edison pursuant to the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), though Edison
had not received state water quality certification as required by the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). FERC denied this request for rehearing
and Trout appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b). The court affirmed
FERC's denial.
This dispute arose from the 1996 expiration of Edison's fifty-year
FPA license for Project 1933 permitting the diversion of water from the
lower portion of the Santa Ana River for both water supply and power
generation. Edison filed an application for a new license for the
project in 1994 and simultaneously requested water quality
certification pursuant to the CWA. The state denied water quality
certification, but Edison received a temporary suspension through
March 2002. After that date Edison filed a new application for water
quality certification.

